Have REIT's helped tame Texas real estate? by John Thompson
exas is known for its turbulent
real estate cycles. More than once,
a run-up in the sector has sud-
denly reversed course, stranding invest-
ors with massive amounts of overvalued
but underoccupied real estate. Newfound
wealth has often vanished nearly as fast
as it appeared. However, despite Texas’
propensity for cyclical extremes, evidence
suggests its real estate markets may now
be less volatile than in the past.
The Texas real estate landscape has
changed considerably in the last two
decades. Some changes have been unmis-
takable. For example, gone are the days
of misguided tax policy, which granted
investors large tax breaks for develop-
ing real estate. Gone also are the days
when unbridled savings and loans could
throw money at virtually any project.
Such notable changes have added sta-
bility to Texas real estate markets.
Other changes have been more subtle
but not without effect. Of particular in-
terest has been the shift of ownership
from private hands to publicly held real
estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs are
real estate companies that own and man-
age properties and whose shares are
traded on a public stock exchange. In
general, REITs can enhance market dis-
cipline by improving efficiency, in-
creasing liquidity and discouraging un-
justified lending. They do this, in part, by
facilitating improved information gather-
ing and sharing. While the proportion 
of total real estate owned by REITs is still
modest, economic intuition suggests that
the increased number of REITs might help
moderate market volatility.
This article discusses REIT activity
and trends at the national level. It then
explores the growth of REITs in Texas
and analyzes Texas REIT performance
against the overall equity market. Finally,
it enumerates some of the differences
between the current Texas real estate
environment and that of the 1980s and
examines REITs’ effect on the state’s real
estate markets.
REITs in the United States
A REIT engages in some combina-
tion of buying, selling, operating or
financing income-producing properties.
Such properties can include apartments,
retail establishments, office buildings,
hotels and warehouses.
REITs differ from traditional real
estate companies—which are often pri-
vate partnerships—because their shares
are publicly traded. Additionally, REITs
are required by law to pay at least 90
percent of taxable income to sharehold-
ers in the form of dividends.
1 In return,
REITs can deduct dividends from their
corporate tax bill. As a result, most REITs
distribute all of their taxable income 
as dividends, avoiding corporate income
taxation. (They are still required to pay
property tax.)
Congress established REITs in 1960
to enable a wider segment of the invest-
ing public to own income-producing real
estate. In effect, REITs make real estate
ownership more accessible by breaking
large fixed assets into bite-size shares and
lowering other barriers to investment.
With the advent of REITs, shareholders
are able to extract the benefits of own-
ing professionally managed real estate
without being subject to the risks of just
a single property. REITs also provide 
liquidity to their investors. In contrast to
private partnerships, REIT investors can
quickly dump real estate holdings by
selling their shares in the market.
REITs fall into three functional cate-
gories. Equity REITs acquire and operate
income-producing properties. Mortgage
REITs lend money to real estate opera-
tors. And hybrid REITs do some of both.
In theory, a management team carries
out the REIT’s daily operations, and a
board of directors makes investment
decisions.
2 However, in practice, direc-
tors often just sign off on investment
decisions already made by management.
Even though REITs emerged over 40
years ago, it was some time before the
industry picked up steam. Early growth
was limited because REITs were only
allowed to own real estate, not manage
it. This arrangement curtailed growth be-
cause investors were reluctant to entrust
property operations to a third party with
possibly misaligned incentives. Also, in-
terest in REITs stumbled initially because
private real estate investors could exploit
a tax shelter not available to REITs; con-
sequently, REITs were less able to com-
pete for capital.
With passage of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, the picture changed. The legis-
lation boasted a two-pronged adjustment
to real estate investment, opening up 
the sector to brisk growth. First, it cur-
tailed opportunities for tax shelters in
private real estate investment. Second, it
expanded REITs’ autonomy by permit-
ting them to manage and operate prop-
erties, not just own them. When the fall-
out from the 1980s real estate depression
and the savings and loan crisis finally
began to clear, REITs were poised for
rapid growth.
3
Starting in the mid-1980s, the num-
ber of REITs trading on the New York,
American and Nasdaq exchanges began
a steady upward trend, peaking at 226 in
1994, then scaling back to 180 by 2002.
4
The increase in REITs was followed by a
dramatic upsurge in the sector’s overall
market capitalization. Between 1992 and
2002, total REIT market capitalization in-
creased more than eightfold (Chart 1).
5
Growth was  so dramatic that by 2001,
REITs controlled roughly 15 percent of
the $2 trillion worth of investment-grade
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commercial properties in the United
States.
6 In fact, by 2001 REITs controlled
40 percent of the equity portion (as
opposed to debt) of institutional real
estate, up from around 1 percent in
1993.
7
The REIT Modernization Act of 1999
gave REITs new opportunities to increase
earnings. The act enabled REITs to offer
more sophisticated services, thus help-
ing them maintain a competitive stance
in the marketplace. The progression of
legislation since REITs’ inception in 1960
has helped the industry flourish.
Coincident with REIT growth was a
more controlled real estate environment
throughout the 1990s. New inventory rel-
ative to absorption was more measured
in the 1990s than the 1980s, and rent
growth was more robust (Table 1).
Some observers have argued that dur-
ing the 2001–02 downturn, REITs helped
prevent a return to the overcapacity
problems that plagued the 1980s.
8 As the
industry matured, improved information
flow and transparency helped discourage
inordinate construction. Despite stratos-
pheric stock market hype during the
1990s, new office construction never
reached the excesses of the ’80s. In fact,
during the recent weakness in national
real estate markets, new completions
dropped off before vacancy rates even
started edging upward. During the ’80s,
vacancy rates shot up over 20 percent
before completions ever began to
decline (Chart 2).
Sharp corrections are still possible,
however. Real spending on U.S. nonresi-
dential building has already declined 26.8
percent since peaking in 2001 (and will
likely decline more before bottoming
out), just below the total decline of 33.3
percent during the 1990–91 recession.
9
While this reversal has damaged the real
estate sector, it is also a sign of increased
market nimbleness and improved ability
to react to changing conditions. Much of
the run-up in spending in the late ’90s
was driven by stock market hype. That
the industry has been able to retrench so
quickly helped avert a more severe over-
building problem.
Historically, real estate supply and
demand have often marched to their
own drummer. However, as REITs own
and manage more real estate, there is
likely to be a tighter alignment between
supply and demand. REITs raise much of
their capital through equity markets,
making it more difficult for them to pur-
sue irrational investment plans. In addi-
tion, REITs must always act to preserve
stock value and eschew activities that
might undermine it. Analyst and investor
U.S. Real Estate, Then and Now
1981–90 1991–2000
Inventory added (million square feet) 1,319.7 406.7
Increase in inventory 98% 15%
Absorption (million square feet) 887.3 647.9
Inventory added/absorbed 149% 63%
Rental rate increase in nominal dollars 7% 51%
Occupancy change –13% 11%
SOURCES: Torto Wheaton Research; Crescent Real Estate Co.
Table 1
Office Vacancy Rates 
and Completions
Sum of U.S. metropolitan markets






















SOURCE: Torto Wheaton Research.scrutiny of REITs has given the market
the ability to quickly punish firms with
investment agendas that aren’t justified
by the fundamentals. While REITs won’t
erase the sector’s cyclical makeup, their
presence may be contributing to increased
market solidity.
REITs in Texas
REITs are playing an increasingly
important role in Texas real estate as
well. The state is ranked fifth in the nation
in total number of operating REITs, fifth
in combined REIT market capitalization
and seventh in total REIT employment.
The biggest REIT markets are Illinois,
California and New York (Table 2).
Texas-based REITs are all headquar-
tered in either the Dallas/Fort Worth or
Houston metropolitan areas, though
their real estate holdings may be located
anywhere in the country. Some REITs
with operations and headquarters in
Texas are actually incorporated in Mary-
land because of its more favorable tax
and regulatory environment for REITs.
Most Texas REITs own and operate vari-
ous types of real estate, including office,
retail, multifamily, restaurant and hotel
properties. One Texas REIT, Capstead
Mortgage Corp., is a mortgage REIT that
loans money to real estate owners and
operators. (See the box titled “Some Large
Texas REITs.”)
The effect of growing REIT numbers
in Texas has not been trivial. For one,
the sector has made efficiency gains.
Because shares are traded on public ex-
changes, investors receive real-time feed-
back on the sector’s relative well-being.
Any negative information, such as over-
supply risks, gets factored into equity
prices, helping safeguard against unreal-
istic zeal and lessening the chance of 
the kind of market blindsiding that has
afflicted Texas real estate in the past.
The growing incidence and size of
REITs have also helped the Texas real
estate sector capture economies of scale.
Such economies occur when the average
cost of a firm’s product declines as the
firm expands the size of its operations.
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Top 10 REIT Markets
Total market cap Average annual Average
(millions of Number of Total dividend per dividend yield
dollars) REITs employment share (dollars) (percent)
1 Illinois 27,676 11 15,083 1.65 6.5
2C a lifornia 24,197 29 9,375 1.51 6.6
3N e w  Y o rk 24,158 25 5,975 1.29 7.1
4M a r yland 9,831 13 7,913 .87 4.2
5T exas 8,413 10 3,067 1.86 8.4
6M assachusetts 7,939 5 925 1.46 6.3
7P ennsylvania 5,559 10 1,881 1.46 7.7
8T ennessee 4,178 7 15,834 1.60 7.5
9G eorgia 4,077 7 3,123 1.38 7.4
10 Florida 3,843 8 1,129 1.09 6.0




Some Large Texas REITs
The following list provides a snapshot of some prominent REITs based in Texas. Size and core business strategy were the basis for selection to the list.
Market cap
Name Location Employees Investment strategy (October 2002)
Camden Property Trust Houston 1,750 Mid- to upper-market multifamily properties in nine Sunbelt $1.26 billion
and Midwestern states.
Capstead Mortgage Corp. Dallas 16 Real estate-related assets such as single-family residential $290 million
mortgage-backed securities issued by government-sponsored
entities. Does not have a core geographic focus. 
Crescent Real Estate Equities Co. Fort Worth 794 Office, resort/hotel, residential development and temperature- $1.62 billion
controlled warehouses. Holdings concentrated in Dallas/Fort Worth 
and Houston.
FelCor Lodging Trust Irving 61 Hotel properties in the United States, mainly Texas, California, $582 million
Florida and Georgia, and in Canada.
Prentiss Properties Trust Dallas 650 Office and industrial properties in the Midwest, Southwest, $1.04 billion
Northern Virginia, Northern and Southern California.
U.S. Restaurant Properties Dallas 181 Operates 811 restaurant and service station properties in 48 states. $257 million
Weingarten Realty Investors Houston 265 Retail properties and, secondarily, industrial holdings in the
southern half of the United States. $1.95 billion
NOTES: Technically, La Quinta Corp. of Irving and Wyndham International of Dallas are REITs because their primary Standardized Industrial Code is 6798-01, or “real estate investment trust.” However, these two companies
were excluded because their operations differ substantially from the REITs mentioned. The REITs above have holdings in one or more of the office, industrial, retail, multifamily or hotel market segments. In contrast,
La Quinta and Wyndham focus exclusively on hotel ownership and management, effectively operating as large national and international hotel chains. As such, they fall outside the scope of this article. Relatively
small REITs were also excluded, including Transcontinental Realty Investors, Dallas; PMC Commercial Trust, Dallas; Income Opportunity Realty Investors, Dallas; FFP Real Estate Trust, Fort Worth; Liberté Investors,
Dallas; Texas Pacific Land Trust, Dallas; and AMRESCO Capital Trust, Dallas.
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REITs capture economies of scale through
brand imaging, access to lower-cost cap-
ital, management productivity and in-
creased bargaining power with customers
and suppliers.
10 For example, Texas REITs
can spread out insurance costs by pur-
chasing umbrella insurance for multiple
properties. Such risk mitigation isn’t gen-
erally feasible for firms with relatively
small numbers of properties.
11
Another effect of higher REIT num-
bers in Texas has been added discipline
through improved monitoring of capital
flows to real estate. Historically, lending
institutions such as savings and loans,
insurance companies and banks commit-
ted a pool of money to real estate at the
beginning of each year, regardless of any
changes that might take place in overall
real estate conditions. Such dedicated
lending was unresponsive to swings in
the marketplace and often led to over-
investment. Real estate companies still
get loan commitments that can be insen-
sitive to changing real estate conditions;
however, this kind of lending is less
prevalent than it used to be.
12
With REITs, when real estate indica-
tors signal weakness in the fundamentals,
equity markets adjust and capital shifts
away from the industry. Thus, money is
free to flow to the most promising oppor-
tunity, not some predetermined invest-
ment. This phenomenon has helped fill
the long-standing demand for liquidity
in what has otherwise been an illiquid
industry. Texas REITs have helped im-
prove market sensitivity to changing con-
ditions, as shown by capital flight from
REIT stocks in 1998 when real estate
markets weakened (Chart 3).
Finally, the requirement that REITs
distribute 90 percent of income through
dividends builds in an added measure 
of discipline because they can only accu-
mulate a limited amount of income to
fund future growth. The result is that
REITs must appeal to capital markets
whenever they want to raise more debt
or equity funding. They can’t fund their
future investments with internal sources.
13
Over the last few years, stock prices of
Texas REITs have fared relatively well com-
pared with the overall market (Chart 4 ).
From January 2000 to June 2002, stock
price appreciation of the largest Texas
REITs easily outperformed the Standard
& Poor’s 500. However, extending the
horizon back to January 1997, only Cam-
den Property Trust, Weingarten Realty and
Prentiss Properties Trust outperformed the
S&P index. Texas REITs outperformed the
market during the tech bust but under-
performed it in the boom years.
Total returns to REIT shareholders
are a combination of stock price appre-
ciation or depreciation and dividends
paid out. Table 3 shows a variety of vari-
ables used to measure REIT perfor-
mance. Dividend yields for the largest
Texas REITs have been strong in the past
year. Total returns for Texas REITs have
been mixed but trending downward.
Market Capitalization of 
Texas REITs
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CrescentDuring an economic downturn, high-
dividend stocks are generally favorable
for a portfolio. However, the current data
point to a rather weak REIT market going
forward. Fundamental real estate condi-
tions in Texas have grown increasingly
tenuous in recent quarters. Vacancy rates
are up everywhere in Texas since last
year, and rental rates have fallen. Until
job growth returns, signaling an increase
in demand for space, excess capacity will
continue to exert downward pressure on
Texas REIT returns.
This Time It Really Is Different
Still, the current weakness in Texas
real estate is relatively benign by histori-
cal measures. Even though commercial
and residential markets have both taken
hits in the past 18 months, the situation
is less extreme than the 1980s increase
and subsequent derailment (Chart 5).
During those years, investors watched in
dismay as bloated commercial contract
values collapsed, office rents gave back
half their peak value and residential mar-
kets took on a burdensome two-year in-
ventory of homes.
14
The environment is less severe now.
Present weakness, while keenly felt in
some sectors, isn’t nearly as encompass-
ing as the pall that settled on Texas two
decades ago. Much of this is due to the
fact that Texas real estate markets haven’t
had as far to fall this time. In the 1970s,
a run-up in oil prices cast a rosy hue on
the energy-dependent state economy, and
many assumed—unrealistically—that ro-
bust energy markets were here to stay.
The optimism spilled over to real estate
markets, and construction crews kicked
into gear.
Later, in the 1980s, federal policy
gave tax advantages to investors willing
to finance real estate projects, feeding
the building frenzy. At the same time,
deregulation freed savings and loans to
invest in service corporations, disregard
geographical considerations in loan deci-
sions and lend up to 40 percent of assets
in commercial real estate. But the new
legislation failed to implement higher
deposit insurance premiums for savings
and loans with precarious loan port-
folios.
15 Exacerbating the problem was
the failure of federal and state regulators
to shut down insolvent thrifts, which
were financing real estate projects that
would have otherwise gone unfunded.
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Texas REIT Performance
Funds from Net asset
Total return Dividend operations Multiple value Prem/(Disc)
Stock (year-to-date, yield (2002E) (stock 2002:2 to NAV
Name Ticker price* percent) (percent) ($/share) price/FFO) ($/share) (percent)
Camden Property Trust CPT 31.3 –9.5 8.0 3.4 9.2 33.3 –5.9
Capstead Mortgage Corp. CMO 20.5 —  25.3 5.3 4.0 — —
Crescent Real Estate Equities Co. CEI 15.6 –7.8 9.6 2.0 7.8 20.8 –25.1
FelCor Lodging Trust FCH 11.1 –31.1 5.4 2.1 5.2 18.4 –40.0
Prentiss Properties Trust PP 26.6 2.8  8.4 3.4 7.9 32.4 –17.9
U.S. Restaurant Properties USV 12.9 –4.7 10.2 1.4 9.2 13.3 –2.9
Weingarten Realty Investors WRI 37.2 21.5  6.0 3.2 11.5 30.9 20.4
* As of October 25, 2002.
NOTES: Total return includes stock price appreciation and reinvested dividends. Dividend yield is annualized, year-to-date dividends divided by stock price; this variable effectively gives an interest rate yield on a stock pur-
chase. Funds from operations (FFO) is analogous to corporate earnings but excludes gains or losses from sales of property or debt restructuring and adds back depreciation of real estate. Multiple is analogous to
corporate price/earnings ratio, or what the market is paying for $1 of earnings. Net asset value (NAV) is a per share measure of the market value of a REIT’s net assets. Prem/(Disc) to NAV [(stock price/NAV–1) × 100]
is the premium or discount of the current share price associated with the net asset value of the company.  
SOURCES: Salomon Smith Barney; Yahoo! Finance.
Table 3
Real Texas Construction Contract Values and Real Rents

























* Seasonally adjusted, real five-month moving average.
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The combination of these forces
rocketed Texas real estate markets to
dizzying heights. But the fundamentals
were never in place to support the rapid
growth. Eventually the party ended
(helped by the Tax Reform Act of 1986),
leaving in its place a huge disequilibrium
between supply and demand. The con-
sequent imbalance sent property values
and rents to damaging lows and dealt
massive losses to real estate institutions.
16
In contrast to the overhyped ’80s, a
speculative building free-for-all didn’t
occur in the late ’90s, and the current
downturn has been far less pronounced.
Recent jumps in subleasing and vacancy
rates, along with liberal rent concessions,
have been somewhat isolated, materializ-
ing in tech-laden areas—such as Austin,
the Dallas suburb of Richardson and Irv-
ing’s Los Colinas business center—and
not as much in the overall marketplace.
Even though excessive growth ex-
pectations seduced equity markets in the
late 1990s and an office glut resulted, the
memory of the ’80s real estate meltdown
helped curb Texas builders. What’s more,
significant changes in the way real estate
gets funded helped control the recent
buildup. During the 1980s, Texas lending
institutions loaned money to practically
anyone with a hammer and saw. This
time, regulatory fixes prompted tighter
scrutiny of capital flows, increased disci-
pline and more transparency. Also, in
reaction to 1980s abuses, banks now re-
quire a higher equity stake from poten-
tial loan recipients. Such hurdles have
curbed frivolous lending.
In addition to these changes, the in-
creased prominence of REITs in Texas
may have helped contribute to a less fre-
netic buildup. Markets can punish REITs
for ill-advised investment strategies by
shunning REIT stocks. This dynamic was
not available in the 1980s because REITs
had not yet become a material part of
the real estate market; they didn’t really
take off until the early 1990s. The gradual
shift of real estate assets from private
partnerships to public REITs has increased
the sector’s transparency, discipline and
sensitivity to market conditions.
Still, the extent to which REITs foster
increased discipline is contingent on
whether markets function correctly in the
first place. Accurate information (not cor-
porate book cooking), rule of law (not
executive malfeasance) and transparency
(not covert and obscure business deal-
ings) are essential to well-functioning
markets. Without these, any positive
effects from REITs would be negligible.
REITs’ Continuing Influence
That the recent boom and bust in
technology markets has not yielded a
1980s-like crash in real estate markets
suggests some things have changed in
Texas in the last two decades. The ’90s
boom never matched the skyscraping
’80s, and it is unlikely the current down-
turn will be as protracted as the one that
gripped the state from 1985 through the
early 1990s. Rolling back perverse tax
incentives and fixing the savings and
loan problem were largely responsible
for the improvement. Additionally, the in-
creased incidence of REITs owning and
managing real estate in Texas and the
subsequent availability of more timely in-
formation may be having a positive effect.
REITs are not a fail-safe mechanism
to avert irrational run-ups in real estate
markets. If nothing else, the 1990s tech
boom illustrated that investors still get
caught up in bubble markets. It’s too
early to tell what ultimate effect REITs
will have on the marketplace. Evidence
in their favor is insufficient, and more
research is needed; plus, they still make
up a relatively small part of the overall
market. But REITs have the potential to
enhance the role of market discipline in
real estate finance. They can also help
improve funding and investment con-
trols and add efficiencies and liquidity to
the market.
Historical examples of misalignment
between fundamental real estate condi-
tions and investor decision-making
abound. Significant improvements in real
estate markets over the past 20 years
have contributed discipline to the real
estate sector, however. As part of these
changes, restraint imposed on REITs
through the threat of punishment in the
equity market has likely contributed to
increased discipline in the industry.
—John Thompson
Thompson is an associate economist in the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
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